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Abstract We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median
stable matchings are well-deﬁned for college admissions problems. Furthermore,
we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with
two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable
matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.
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market and colleges’ capacity constraints. An outcome for such a college admis-
sions market, a matching, is an assignment of students to colleges such that each
student is matched to at most one college and no college is matched to more stu-
dents than its capacity allows for. A key property for college admissions markets
is stability: a matching is stable if it satisﬁes individual rationality and no coalition
of agents can improve by rematching among themselves (no blocking).
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For college admissions markets with responsive preferences,1 the set of stable
matchings is nonempty (Roth 1985) and has a speciﬁc lattice structure (Roth and
Sotomayor 1990). A direct consequence of this lattice structure is the polarization
of stable matchings in the sense that there is a best stable matching for the colleges
(students) which is at the same time the worst stable matching for the students
(colleges). Thus, both extreme stable matchings clearly favor one side of the mar-
ket over the other. Masarani and Gokturk (1989) showed several impossibilities
to obtain a fair deterministic matching mechanism within the context of Rawlsian
justice based on cardinal preference information. One way to recover fairness is to
use probabilistic (stable) matching mechanisms that are ex ante fair and/or ‘proce-
durally fair;’ see for instance Aldershof et al. (1999), Klaus and Klijn (2006), and
Ma (1996).
Using another approach, Teo and Sethuraman (1998) and Sethuraman et al.
(2004) established the existence of natural deterministic ‘compromising mecha-
nisms’formarriageandcollegeadmissionsmodels,respectively.Speciﬁcally,they
showed that if all agents order their (possibly non-distinct) matches at the, say, k
stable matchings from best to worst, then the map that assigns to each agent of
one side of the market its lth best match and to each agent of the other side its
(k −l +1)st best match constitutes a stable matching. Teo and Sethuraman (1998)
and Sethuraman et al. (2004) used linear programming tools to prove that these
‘(generalized) median stable matchings’ are indeed well-deﬁned and stable. We
use the term ‘(generalized) median’ to emphasize not only the formal equivalence
of this solution concept to (generalized) medians in voting theory, but also to its
similar spirit of compromise (Moulin 1980; Barberà et al. 1993).
In this note, we provide a very short and direct proof that all (generalized)
median stable matchings are well-deﬁned and stable. Our proof is based on the
lattice structure of the set of stable matchings (Fleiner 2002, Theorem 5.5, inde-
pendentlyobtainedthesameresultforamoreabstracttwo-sidedmatchingmodel).
Given that for responsive preferences the lattice structure reﬂects the polarization
and trade-offs that occur between the two sides of the market, any median sta-
ble matching combines stability with some degree of ‘endstate’ fairness. Hence,
median stable matchings are compromise solutions that can be applied to conﬂict
situations that resemble college admissions problems.
The rest of the note is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce college
admissions markets and recall some results concerning stable matchings that we
needforourproof.Insection3,wepresentourproofoftheexistenceofgeneralized
medianstablematchings,deﬁnethesubsetofmedianstablematchingsanddiscuss
their fairness properties. We conclude with two examples of college admissions
markets for which we illustrate the associated lattices of stable matchings and the
corresponding generalized median stable matchings.
2 College admissions markets
There are two ﬁnite and disjoint sets of agents: a set S ={ s1,...,sm} of students
and a set C ={ C1,...,Cn} of colleges. We denote a generic student by s and a
1 Byresponsiveness(Roth1985),acollege’spreferencerelationoversetsofstudentsisrelated
toitsrankingofsinglestudentsinthefollowingway:thecollegealwayspreferstoaddanaccept-
able student to any set of students (provided this does not violate the capacity constraint) and it
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generic college by C. For each college C, there is a ﬁxed quota qC that represents
the number of positions it offers.2
Each student s has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation  s
over the colleges and the prospect of being unmatched. Hence, student s’s prefer-
ences can be represented by a strict ordering P(s) of the elements in C ∪{ s}.I f
C ∈ C such that C  s s,t h e nw ec a l lC an acceptable college for student s.L e t
PS ={P(s)}s∈S.
A set of students S  ⊆ S is feasible for college C if |S |≤qC. Each col-
lege C has a complete and transitive preference relation  C over feasible sets of
students, which can be represented by a weak ordering P(C) of the elements in
P(S,qC) ≡{ S  ⊆ S :| S |≤qC}. We make two assumptions on the preferences
of a college C.3
First, C’s preferences over singleton sets of students, or equivalently over indi-
vidual students, are strict. For notational convenience we denote a singleton set {s}
by s. The second assumption describes comparisons of feasible sets of students
when a single student is added or replaced. If s ∈ S is such that s  C ∅,t h e nw e
call s an acceptable student for college C.I fs,s  ∈ S are such that s  C s ,t h e n
we call student s a better student than student s  for college C. We assume that
eachcollegeC’spreferencesoverfeasiblesetsofstudentsarebasedonpreferences
over individual students such that C always prefers to add an acceptable student
and it also prefers to replace any student by a better student. More formally, we
assume that C’s preferences are responsive, i.e., for all S  ∈ P(S,qC),
(r1) if s  ∈ S  and |S | < qC,t h e n(S  ∪ s)  C S  if and only if s  C ∅ and
(r2) if s  ∈ S  and t ∈ S ,t h e n

(S \t) ∪ s

 C S  if and only if s  C t.
Let PC ={P(C)}C∈C.
A college admissions market is a triple (S,C, P),w h e r eP = (PS, PC).A
matching for college admissions market (S,C, P) is a function µ on the set S ∪ C
such that
(m1) each student is either matched to exactly one college or unmatched, i.e.,
for all s ∈ S, either µ(s) ∈ C or µ(s) = s,
(m2) each college is matched to a feasible set of students, i.e.,
for all C ∈ C, µ(C) ∈ P(S,qC),a n d
(m3) a student is matched to a college if and only if the college is matched to the
student, i.e., for all s ∈ S and C ∈ C,µ ( s) = C if and only if s ∈ µ(C).
Given matching µ, we call µ(s) student s’s match and µ(C) college C’s match.
A key property of matchings is stability. First, we impose a voluntary partici-
pation condition. A matching µ is individually rational if neither a student nor a
college would be better off by breaking a current match, i.e., if µ(s) = C,t h e n
C  s s and µ(C)  C (µ(C)\s). By responsiveness of  C, the latter require-
ment can be replaced by s  C ∅. Thus alternatively, a matching µ is individually
rationalifanystudentandanycollegethatarematchedtooneanotheraremutually
acceptable. Second, if a student s and a college C are not matched to one another
at a matching µ but the student would prefer to be matched to the college and
2 The marriage model is the special case of one-to-one (two-sided) matching where for all
C ∈ C, qC = 1.
3 See Roth and Sotomayor (1989) for a discussion of these assumptions.4 B. Klaus, F. Klijn
the college would prefer to either add the student or replace another student by
student s, then we would expect this mutually beneﬁcial adjustment to be carried
out. Formally, a pair (s,C), s  ∈ µ(C),i sablocking pair if C  s µ(s) and (a)
[|µ(C)| < qC and s  C ∅]or (b) [there exists t ∈ µ(C) such that s  C t ].4
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and there are no blocking pairs.
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the set of stable matchings for college
admissions market (S,C, P) by  (P) ={ µ1,...,µ k}.
Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that  (P)  =∅ . Roth and Sotomayor (1989)
proved that each college has strict preferences over different sets of students that
theyarematchedtoatdifferentstablematchings(eventhoughtheymaybeindiffer-
entbetweenotherfeasiblesetsofstudents).Notethatasimilarresultforthestudents
holds trivially because of the strictness of the students’ preferences.
Theorem 2.1 [Roth and Sotomayor (1989), Theorem 3] Let µ,µ  ∈  (P) and
C ∈ C. Then, either µ(C)  C µ (C), µ (C)  C µ(C),o rµ(C) = µ (C).
Infact,thesetofstablematchingshasseveralotherappealingfeatures,allofwhich
are due to its speciﬁc lattice structure, which we explain next.
For any two stable matchings µ and µ  we deﬁne the function µ ∨S µ  that
assigns to each student his/her more preferred match from µ and µ  and to each
college its less preferred match from µ and µ .5 Formally, we deﬁne the function
λ := µ ∨S µ  on the set S ∪ C as follows. For all s ∈ S,l e tλ(s) := µ(s) if
µ(s)  s µ (s) and λ(s) := µ (s) otherwise. For all C ∈ C,l e tλ(C) := µ (C)
if µ(C)  C µ (C) and λ(C) := µ(C) otherwise. In a similar way we deﬁne the
function µ ∧S µ  that assigns to each student his/her less preferred match and to
each college its more preferred match.
Theorem 2.2 [Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Theorem 5.31] Let µ,µ  ∈  (P).
Then, µ ∨S µ  ∈  (P) and µ ∧S µ  ∈  (P).
Letµ,µ betwostablematchings.Wewriteµ  S µ ifforalls ∈ S,µ(s)  s µ (s),
andforsomes  ∈ S,µ(s )  s  µ (s ).Similarly,wewriteµ  C µ  ifforallC ∈ C,
µ(C)  C µ (C), and for some C  ∈ C, µ(C )  C  µ (C ). Note that  S and  C
are partial orders on the set of stable matchings  (P).
Theorem 2.3 [Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Theorem 5.29] The partial orders
 S and  C are dual partial orders on the set of stable matchings  (P), i.e., for
any µ,µ  ∈  (P), µ  S µ  if and only if µ   C µ.
Summarizing Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 in algebraic terms, we obtain the following
characterization of the set of stable matchings.
Corollary 2.4 [RothandSotomayor(1990),Corollary5.32]Theset (P)forms
a lattice under the partial orders  C or  S with the lattice under the ﬁrst partial
order being the dual to the lattice under the second partial order.
4 Recall that by responsiveness (a) implies (µ(C) ∪ s)  C µ(C) and (b) implies
((µ(C)\t) ∪ s)  C µ(C).
5 Note that by Theorem 2.1 each college’s less (or more) preferred match from µ and µ  is
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3 Generalized median stable matchings
We ﬁrst introduce generalized median stable matchings. The main result of this
section is a very simple proof that for any college admissions market, generalized
median stable matchings are well-deﬁned and stable (Theorem 3.2). In contrast to
Sethuraman et al. (2004), who used a linear programming approach, our proof is
based on the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings. Proceeding from the
existence of generalized median stable matchings, we deﬁne the subset of median
stable matchings and discuss their fairness properties (Deﬁnition 3.5, Remark 3.6,
Example3.7).Finally,wegiveanillustrativeexampleofgeneralizedmedianstable
matchings in a college admissions market (Example 3.8).
Consider a college admissions market (S,C, P). Then, the set of stable match-
ings  (P) ={ µ1,...,µ k} is nonempty. Each student can order the matchings in






={ µ1,...,µ k} and for anyl ∈{ 1,...,k − 1}, either µs




l+1(s). Thus, for any l ∈{ 1,...,k},a tµs
l student s is assigned to his/her lth
‘(weakly) best’ match among all k stable matchings. For anyl ∈{ 1,...,k},d e ﬁ n e
thefunctionαS
l ontheset S suchthatforalls ∈ S,αS
l (s) :=µs
l(s).
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l+1(C). Thus, for any l ∈{ 1,...,k},a tµC
l college C is assigned to its lth





In Theorem 3.2 we state that for any l ∈{ 1,...,k}, functions αS
l and αC
k−l+1
together constitute a well-deﬁned and stable matching.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Generalizedmedianstablematchings)Letl ∈{ 1,...,k}.Then,
the lth student optimal generalized median stable matching is deﬁned by function
αS
l that assigns all students to their lth (weakly) best match among all k stable
matchings. Similarly, the lth college optimal generalized median stable matching
is deﬁned by function αC
l that assigns all colleges to their lth (weakly) best match
among all k stable matchings.6
6 We would like to make two short remarks on the deﬁnition of generalized median stable
matchings:
(1) We use the term ‘generalized median stable matching’ because for any l ∈{ 1,...,k} the lth
(weakly) best match can be represented as the median of all k matches with k − 1 extra weights
onthelth(weakly)bestmatch;i.e.,l = med{1,...,l,...,l   
k times
,...,k}(forasimilaruseoftheterm
‘generalized median’ see for instance Moulin’s (1980) generalized median voter rules).
(2) Determining the set of generalized median stable matchings is only possible if the set
of stable matchings is known. Gusﬁeld and Irving (1989, section 3.5, pp. 121) provided a
time- and space-optimal algorithm for enumerating all stable matchings for one-to-one match-
ing markets (S,C, P) (i.e., for all C ∈ C, qC = 1) where |S|=| C|=m; their algo-
rithm needs O(m2 + m|

(P)|) total time. Using responsiveness and Roth and Sotomayor
(1989), Lemma 5.6, Gusﬁeld and Irving’s (1989) time- and space-optimal algorithm can
be straightforwardly adjusted to college admissions markets with a complexity of time of
O(m





(P)|).6 B. Klaus, F. Klijn
Sethuraman et al. (2004) used linear programming tools to prove the following
theorem. We give a simple proof of this result by exploiting the lattice structure of
the set of stable matchings.
Theorem 3.2 (Generalized median stable matchings are well-deﬁned and sta-
ble) All student optimal and all college optimal generalized median stable match-
ingsarewell-deﬁnedandstablematchings.Furthermore,foranyl ∈{ 1,...,k},the
lthstudentoptimalgeneralizedmedianstablematchingequalsthe(k−l+1)stcol-
lege optimal generalized median stable matching. Formally, for all l ∈{ 1,...,k}
there exists a stable matching γ ∈

(P) such that for all s ∈ S, γ(s) = αS
l (s),
and for all C ∈ C, γ(C) = αC
k−l+1(C).
Proof Let l ∈{ 1,...,k}. For all choices of l matchings ν1,...,ν l out of the k
stable matchings it follows from Theorem 2.2 that ν1 ∧S ···∧S νl, the match-
ing where all students are assigned to their least preferred match of all matchings





distinct) stable matchings obtained in this way by β1,...,βN. By Theorem 2.2,
γ = β1 ∨S ···∨S βN, the matching where all students are assigned to their most
preferred match of all matchings in {β1,...,βN}, is well-deﬁned and stable, i.e.,
γ ∈  (P).
Consider a student s ∈ S. Note that for all r ∈{ 1,...,N}, αS
l (s)  s βr(s),
which implies αS




l (s), which implies γ(s)  s αS
l (s). Hence, for all s ∈ S, γ(s) =
αS
l (s). Finally, from the deﬁnition of ∨S and ∧S and Corollary 2.4 it follows that
for all C ∈ C, γ(C) = αC
k−l+1(C).    
Given Theorem 3.2, from now on and with some abuse of notation, the func-
tions αS
l and αC






Next, we comment on the relation between our result and Fleiner (2002, Theorem
5.5) and describe an alternative proof of Theorem 3.2.
Remark 3.3 (Alternativeproofs)Afterﬁnishingtheﬁrstdraftofthisarticle,thanks
to Jay Sethuraman, we became aware of a similar proof for the marriage model
due to Fleiner (2002, Theorem 5.5). In fact, Fleiner (2002) noted that his Theo-
rem 5.5 can be generalized to a more abstract setting. However, for more general
models than the college admissions market (with responsive preferences!) the set
of stable matchings can only be endowed with a lattice structure if ∨S and ∧S are
replaced by binary operations that do not necessarily reﬂect agents’ preferences
over stable matchings (cf. Blair 1988; Martínez et al. 2001). Consequently, since
then the lattice structure does not reﬂect any polarization between agents accord-
ing to their preferences over stable matchings, for more general models it is no
longer clear how far the ‘generalized median stable matchings’ are natural com-
promises. In fact, apart from giving a simple proof of Theorem 3.2 for the college
admissions market, we would like to argue that Fleiner’s (2002, Theorem 5.5)
and our (Theorem 3.2) result does not only describe ‘(mathematical) operations’
that induce stable matchings, but that these ‘operations’ reﬂect fairness trade-offsMedian stable matching for college admissions 7
between stable matchings. In Remark 3.6 we comment on these fairness aspects
of median stable matchings.
Finally,thereisanothersimpleproofofTheorem3.2basedonTeoandSethura-
man’s(1998, Theorem2)resultformarriagemarkets.Theproofworksasfollows.
First, one uses the well-known technique of transforming a college admissions
market (with responsive preferences) into a related marriage market by replicating
all colleges according to their quota such that all qC − 1 copies of a college have
the same preferences as the original college C and such that each student replaces
acollegebyaﬁxedorderoverthecollegeanditsreplicas(seeRothandSotomayor
1990; section 5.3.1, pp. 131). Then, Teo and Sethuraman’s (1998, Theorem 2)
result applies to the related marriage market. Since by Roth and Sotomayor (1990,
Lemma 5.6) stable matchings in the related marriage market correspond to stable
matchings in the original college admissions market, any generalized median sta-
ble matching for the related marriage market is also a generalized median stable
matching for the original college admissions market and vice versa.7
The next remark clariﬁes two implications of Theorem 3.2.
Remark 3.4 (i) NotethatDeﬁnition3.1andTheorem3.2canbestraightforwardly
generalized to any subset    ⊆  (P) of stable matchings. In this case, however, a














When the number of stable matching is odd, Teo and Sethuraman (1998) and
Sethuramanetal.(2004)provedtheexistenceoftheso-calledmedianstablematch-
ingforthemarriagemodelandthecollegeadmissionsmodel,respectively,i.e.,giv-
ing each student and each college the ‘median’ match in the set of stable matches
yieldsagainastablematching.Next,independentlyofthenumberofstablematch-
ing being odd or even, we deﬁne ‘median stable matchings.’
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Median stable matchings) If k is odd, then the set of median
















) the lower student (upper college)






) the upper student (lower college)
median stable matching.T h eset of median stable matchings M(P) consists of














Theorem 3.2 implies that for any college admissions market the set of median
stable matchings M(P) is well-deﬁned and M(P) ⊆  (P).
7 This alternative and elegant proof of Theorem 3.2 was suggested by one of the referees.8 B. Klaus, F. Klijn
Remark 3.6 (Fairness aspects) Even when using cardinal preference information
(either based on cardinal utility functions or using the rankings of matches in the
preferenceordersascardinalmeasurement)amatchingthatcombinesstabilityand
certain (endstate) fairness criteria may not exist (Masarani and Gokturk 1989). In
the absence of a clear criterion for what constitutes a fair outcome, Klaus and
Klijn (2006) therefore applied Rawls’s (1971) principle of ‘pure procedural jus-
tice’ and identiﬁed two procedurally fair and stable matching mechanisms. Given
Masarani and Gokturk’s (1989) negative and Klaus and Klijn’s (2006) positive
results, it would seem that we could only expect procedural fairness, but not end-
state fairness, in combination with stability. However, median stable matchings
satisfy various aspects of endstate fairness different from those of Masarani and
Gokturk (1989). First, the mere fact that based on the ordinal preferences, each
agent is assigned to a median stable match should be considered an endstate fair-
nessresultgiventhestabilityconstraints.Inadditiontothisendstatefairnessaspect
that is induced by using medians, it is interesting to note that two further fairness
properties are satisﬁed by median stable matchings for marriage markets (where
all colleges have quota one). First of all, both sides of the market are treated sym-
metrically; i.e., exchanging the roles of students and colleges will not change the
median stable matching(s). Second, an agent who is assigned to the same match
at all stable matchings, called a dummy agent, does not inﬂuence the matches of
other agents. Thus, median stable matchings are independent of dummy agents.8
Our next example illustrates how the median stable matching coincides with what
forthisexamplemaybecalledtheendstatecompromisematching.KlausandKlijn
(2006) demonstrated for the same example that none of the procedurally fair and
stable matching mechanisms they analyzed ever chooses the endstate compromise
matching. For notational convenience, in this and the next example we only list
acceptable colleges (students) in students’ (colleges’) preferences.
Example 3.7 (The median stable matching equals the endstate compromise) Let
(S,C, P) with S ={ s1,s2,s3}, C ={ C1,C2,C3}, qC1 = qC2 = qC3 = 1, and P
listed below. The three stable matchings for this market are listed below as well
(for example, µ1 matches s1 to C1, s2 to C3,a n ds3 to C2).
Preferences Stable matchings
P(s1) = C1 C2 C3 µ1 = C1 C3 C2
P(s2) = C3 C1 C2 µ2 = C2 C1 C3
P(s3) = C2 C3 C1 µ3 = C3 C2 C1
P(C1) = s3 s2 s1
P(C2) = s2 s1 s3
P(C3) = s1 s3 s2
At matching µ1 all students (colleges) are assigned to their most (least) preferred
match. Matching µ3 establishes the other extreme: all colleges (students) are as-
signedtotheirmost(least)preferredmatch.Atmatchingµ2 allagentsarematched
to their second choice, which is why we consider µ2 to be an endstate compromise
in this situation. We depict the corresponding lattice in Fig. 1. The nodes denote
the stable matchings. The solid arcs denote comparability or unanimity on each
8 The exact formulation of this property is given in Klaus and Klijn (2006) and can easily be










Fig. 1 Example 3.7 – lattice of stable matchings
side of the market. For instance µ2 → µ1 in Fig. 1 means that all students weakly
prefertheirmatchesatµ1 totheirmatchesatµ2 andallcollegesweaklyprefertheir





the median stable matching αS
2 equals the endstate compromise matching µ2.    
We conclude with an example of a more general college admissions market and its
generalized median stable matchings.
Example 3.8 Let (S,C, P) with S ={ s1,...,s11}, C ={ C1,...,C5},a n dP
be given by Tables 1 and 2 (by responsiveness it sufﬁces to present colleges’
Table 1 Example 3.8 – students’ preferences
Students’ preferences
P(s1) = C3 C1 C5 C4
P(s2) = C1 C3 C4 C2 C5
P(s3) = C4 C5 C3 C1 C2
P(s4) = C3 C4 C1 C5
P(s5) = C1 C4 C2
P(s6) = C4 C3 C2 C1 C5
P(s7) = C2 C5 C1 C3
P(s8) = C1 C3 C2 C5 C4
P(s9) = C4 C1 C5
P(s10) = C3 C1 C5 C2 C4
P(s11) = C5 C4 C1 C3 C2
Table 2 Example 3.8 – quota and colleges’ preferences
Quota Colleges’ preferences
4 P(C1) = s3 s7 s9 s11 s5 s4 s10 s8 s6 s1 s2
3 P(C2) = s5 s7 s10 s6 s8 s2 s3 s11
3 P(C3) = s11 s6 s8 s3 s2 s4 s7 s1 s10
2 P(C4) = s10 s1 s2 s11 s4 s9 s5 s3 s6 s8
1 P(C5) = s2 s4 s10 s7 s6 s1 s8 s3 s11 s910 B. Klaus, F. Klijn
Table 3 Example 3.8 – stable matchings
Matching s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11
µ1 C3 C1 C4 C3 C1 C3 C2 C1 C4 C1 C5
µ2 C1 C3 C4 C3 C1 C3 C2 C1 C4 C1 C5
µ3 C3 C1 C5 C3 C1 C3 C2 C1 C4 C1 C4
µ4 C1 C3 C5 C3 C1 C3 C2 C1 C4 C1 C4
µ5 C5 C3 C3 C4 C1 C3 C2 C1 C1 C1 C4
µ6 C5 C4 C3 C1 C1 C3 C2 C3 C1 C1 C4





















Fig. 2 Example 3.8 – lattice of stable matchings
preferences by strict orderings of individual students).9 We list all seven stable
matchingsinTable3.WedepictthecorrespondinglatticeinFig.2.Again,thenodes
denote the stable matchings and the solid arcs denote comparability or unanimity
on each side of the market. The dotted edge µ2 ···µ3 denotes incomparability on
each side of the market. In other words, there is disagreement among the students
(colleges) about which matching is better (for instance, µ3(s1)  s1 µ2(s1),b u t
µ2(s3)  s2 µ3(s3)). The generalized median stable matchings are depicted by the
9 This college admissions market is taken from Gusﬁeld and Irving (1989). It is also used by
Sethuraman et al. (2004).Median stable matching for college admissions 11
gray-ﬁlled nodes: αS
1 = αS
2 = µ1, αS
3 = αS
4 = µ4, αS
5 = µ5, αS
6 = µ6,a n d
αS
7 = µ7. Since the number of stable matchings is odd, the set of median stable
matchings is a singleton given by M(P) ={ µ4}.    
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